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Abstract
We assess the differences in downward nominal and real wage rigidity between
natives and immigrants in Portugal, using a matched employer-employee database
and the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) methodology. This methodology
estimates a notional or counterfactual distribution that would prevail under wage
flexibility and compares it to the empirical wage distribution. The estimated measures
of wage rigidity capture the share of workers that received a wage freeze but would
receive a wage cut in the absence of rigidity. We found that the differences between
natives and immigrants are not substantial, but immigrants are more prone to
institutional-related rigidities.
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1 Introduction
The impact of immigration on the labour market of the host country is an issue much
debated for several years and there is an extensive strand of the literature devoted to it.
The literature has mostly focused in two different but interrelated broad questions.
First, how do immigrants perform in the host country? It is commonly observed that
immigrants earn less upon arrival than comparable native workers but that this wage
disadvantage tends to diminish as experience in the host economy increases (Borjas 1999).
However, wage assimilation tends to differ across nationalities and, in some countries, the
catching up is never complete.
Second, what is the impact of immigration on natives’ wages and employment? In a
competitive labour market, an increase in the supply of immigrant workers should result
in a lower wage or higher unemployment of natives whose skills are substitute and impact
positively the natives with complementary skills. However, empirically there is no con-
sensus and, depending on the data and methodology, some studies found a negative and
significant effect in native wages (Borjas 2003) but the majority of studies did not obtain
a sizeable effect on employment and wages of natives (Ottaviano and Peri 2012).
Assessing the effects of immigration on the labour market of the host country is a
complex task. The specificities of immigrant workers in terms of their characteristics
and behaviour - lower reservation wages, substitute/complementary skills, higher respon-
siveness to regional differences in employment opportunities - influence labour market
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efficiency, equilibrium unemployment and wage setting mechanisms. Focusing on the lat-
ter, we aim at contributing to the literature by comparing the extent of downward nominal
and real wage rigidity for natives and immigrants in Portugal.
With the increasing availability of large employer-employee databases, different
approaches have emerged in the literature to estimate aggregate wage rigidities from
micro data on individual wages. The International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP)
methodology applied in this paper is one of them. This methodology resulted from the
combined effort of a large network studying wage rigidities from individual data of 16
OECD countries, so it has a strong potential of cross-country comparisons. After exten-
sive testing of the differentmicroeconomic approaches existing in the literature, the IWFP
methodology was developed to simultaneously estimate the extent of nominal and real
wage rigidity and account for measurement error. Evidence of rigidity is obtained by
comparing the empirical distribution of wage changes to an estimated notional or coun-
terfactual wage change distribution that would prevail in the absence of rigidity. The
estimated measures of nominal and real wage rigidity capture the proportion of workers
that received a (nominal or real) wage freeze but would have received a (nominal or real)
wage cut under wage flexibility.
As far as we know, this is the first attempt to use this microeconomic approach on
wage rigidity differentiating workers by nationality.We did not find substantial differences
between natives and immigrants in terms of wage rigidity, but the estimated measures
tend to be higher for immigrants, in particular for real wage rigidity. This is associated
with the impact of institutional-related rigidity given the higher proportion of immigrants
earning the minimum wage.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential differences between
natives and immigrants in terms of wage rigidity. Section 3 presents the longitudinal
database used and describes the main characteristics of immigrants relative to those of
native workers. The IWFPmethodology used in the estimation of wage rigidity is outlined
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results, accounting for the heterogeneity of
immigrants by main origins. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Motivation
Nominal and real wage rigidity is associated with labour market frictions that prevent the
normal adjustment of wages to labour demand, limiting firms’ ability to accommodate
disturbances in the demand for their products. As opposed to wage flexibility, a rigid wage
frameworkmay lead to an adjustment that generates unemployment. The articles in a spe-
cial feature of The Economic Journal (see (Goette et al. 2007) for a summary) estimate the
incidence of nominal and real wage rigidity using a common methodology and worker-
level data for Germany, Italy and the UK and find evidence that downward wage rigidities
are associated with unfavourable labour market outcomes, in particular unemployment.
If downward wage rigidity is lower for immigrant workers, then immigration would con-
tribute to grease the wheels of the labourmarket. On the contrary, higher downward wage
rigidity for immigrants could amplify the cyclicality of immigrant unemployment, which
is typically higher than for natives (Dustmann et al. 2010). But should wage rigidity differ
between native and immigrant workers?
The predictions of labour market theories do not all point in the same direction regard-
ing the degree of rigidity for natives and immigrants (see (Campbell and Kamlani 1997)
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for a discussion of the alternative theories on wage rigidity). According to the insider-
outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), insiders have more power to influence the
wage-setting process and tend to have higher wage rigidity. As native workers tend to
have more bargaining power, this suggests that they could have more rigid wages. Fur-
thermore, in Portugal the share of immigrants with permanent contracts is much smaller
than the share of natives. So, the contract theory (Taylor 1979) also suggests that native
workers would have higher wage rigidity. The adverse selection model applied to quits
predicts that the most productive workers are most likely to quit after a wage cut. So,
firms would be less likely to cut wages of the more-skilled and/or more-tenured workers.
In addition, firms are more willing to retain workers with more firm-specific human cap-
ital which also implies a higher rigidity of wages of workers with higher tenure. Given the
recent nature of most immigrant flows in Portugal, these theories suggest a higher wage
rigidity for natives.
In contrast, as discussed in (Du Caju et al. 2007), the cost of losing a job is higher for
older workers and workers with higher tenure. These workers have, therefore, less incen-
tive to shirk or quit, even in presence of wage cuts, implying a higher likelihood of a wage
cut for them and, thus, lower wage rigidity. The opposite applies to immigrants, which
are, on average, younger and have lower tenures.
Institutional factors can also play a role on the degree of rigidity for natives and
immigrants. As immigrant workers in Portugal tend to be at the bottom of the wage distri-
bution, their wages are more likely to be (fully) determined by the legal lower boundaries
to wages (national minimum wage and wage floors of sectoral agreements) and, thus, will
be more rigid. Overall, assessing whether wage rigidity is higher for immigrant or native
workers is ultimately an empirical question.
3 Database and exploratory analysis
The database used is Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset matching work-
ers and firms based in Portugal. This administrative data draws on an annual mandatory
employment survey that covers virtually all firms with wage earners in a reference month
(October), excluding public administration and domestic work. Besides the advantage of
its comprehensive coverage, it is also generally recognised that this dataset is reliable by
virtue of its public availability.
Reported data include several characteristics of firms (e.g. identifier, location, employ-
ment) and workers (e.g. identifier, education, type of contract, hours worked, earnings).
Some filters were imposed on the database to eliminate erroneous, inconsistent ormissing
reports. First, the analysis was restricted to individuals for whom there was information
available for a set of key variables, such as gender, age, nationality and sector of activity.
Second, we further restricted our sample to workers aged between 15 and 80 years and
with a job tenure below 65 years. Third, we focused our analysis on the full-time employ-
ees segment and we only considered those employees that reported a base wage of at
least 80 percent of the minimum legal wage1. Fourth, we used a regular wage measure
that includes the base wage (monthly gross pay for normal hours of work) and the regular
subsidies and premiums paid on a monthly basis, like seniority payments.
The worker-level data cover all years since 1986, except 1990 and 2001, but informa-
tion on the nationality of the worker only starts in 2000, so our sample period starts in
2002 and ends in 2008. The exact nationality at the country level is the only information
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available to identify immigrant workers in QP, as neither the place of birth nor the year of
arrival in Portugal are recorded. Nevertheless, given the low naturalisation rate, the sam-
ple of immigrants covered in the QP database seems to be a good approximation of the
target population.
3.1 Exploratory analysis
Historically, Portugal has been a country of emigration, but in the late nineties immigra-
tion flows grew strongly driven by high labour demand. A significant share of this new
immigration flows came from Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), i.e., from
countries with no evident cultural link with Portugal. More recently, there was a very sig-
nificant increase in immigrants from Brazil. Immigration from China, although growing
strongly in the last decade, still represents a small share of total immigrant workers. At
present, three major groups make up the bulk of immigration in Portugal, representing
around 75 percent of total: Brazil, Portuguese speaking countries in Africa (PALOP) and
CEEC.
Full-time employed immigrants increased by 47 percent from 2002 to 2008, represent-
ing 6.4 percent of total employment in 2008. Table 1 reports the sample means of some
relevant variables for natives and immigrants, as well as for the main nationalities of
immigrant workers.
One of the most notable differences between immigrants and natives relates to the type
of contract. In the 2002-2008 period, more than half of immigrant workers had a fixed-
term contract, compared to around 22 percent for natives. Immigrants from Brazil and
CEEC have the highest proportion of fixed-term contracts.
Immigrant workers are younger than natives. Workers with less than 35 years account
for around 43 percent of total natives but represent about 50 percent of immigrants. This
difference is higher in the case of workers from China and, especially, from Brazil.
Given the recent nature of immigration in Portugal, the average tenure of immigrant
workers is much lower than that of natives. Within immigrants, tenure is higher for work-
ers from the EU15 and, to a lesser extent, from PALOP, which are the immigrant groups
that have been longer in the country. The proportion of immigrants with tenure less than
1 year is more than double the share of natives in the same situation. Around 44 percent
of native workers have tenure up to 3 years, but that proportion increases to almost 80
percent in the case of immigrants. This result is in line with the higher incidence of fixed-
term contracts, mostly with a length of 3 years, in immigrant employment. The share of
immigrants with tenure up to 3 years is especially high among workers from China, Brazil
and CEEC.
The differences in educational attainment between natives and immigrants as a whole
are not substantial, even if the share of illiterates is higher for immigrants. However,
there are important differences among the main immigrant groups. Immigrants from
China stand out by their extremely low educational level, while the educational attain-
ment of immigrants from the EU15 is significantly higher than that of all other nationality
groups.
Immigrant employment is concentrated in a few sectors, namely construction and some
services activities. Construction is the main sector of immigrant employment in Portugal,
accounting for almost 24 percent of the total. The employment share of the services sector
as a whole is similar for natives and immigrants but the breakdown within services is
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Table 1Main characteristics of total native and immigrant workers in Portugal, average
2002-2008
Natives Immigrants EU15 PALOP CEEC Brazil China
Total, levels in 2008 2,324,699 159,539 13,294 39,305 37,638 42,266 2,670
Share in total, 2008 93.6 6.4 8.3 24.6 23.6 26.5 1.7
Type of contract (%)
Permanent contract 77.6 45.2 66.3 49.6 35.4 35.9 44.0
Fixed-term contract 22.4 54.8 33.7 50.4 64.6 64.1 56.0
Age
Average years 37.9 35.7 36.5 36.5 36.3 33.0 34.3
% workers aged less 35 years 43.4 50.5 51.1 45.7 47.5 62.4 53.9
Tenure
Average years 7.5 2.5 4.1 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
[0, 3] 43.7 78.6 61.8 74.6 86.2 88.0 89.1
of which <1 15.8 37.7 24.2 37.7 38.6 46.8 43.4
Educational attainment (%)
Illiterate 1.2 4.1 0.5 4.8 6.3 1.7 15.4
4 years completed 24.0 23.2 7.9 34.1 20.6 16.7 38.8
6 years completed 22.1 17.0 11.7 16.9 16.9 18.5 15.0
9 years completed 21.6 24.3 19.9 21.8 26.7 27.9 20.0
12 years completed 20.0 23.0 29.7 16.7 23.7 29.3 7.6
Tertiary 11.0 8.5 30.2 5.8 5.9 5.8 3.2
Main sectors of activity (%)
Manufacturing industry 28.4 15.7 20.6 8.8 22.0 10.7 1.4
Construction 11.4 23.7 8.2 28.5 31.9 19.2 0.6
Services, of which: 57.6 57.6 68.9 61.9 40.0 68.3 98.0
Wholesale and retail trade 20.0 13.5 19.9 11.1 9.1 15.8 49.9
Hotels and restaurants 6.2 15.3 11.5 14.6 10.6 23.5 45.1
Business services 9.6 15.5 12.8 23.6 10.7 15.2 1.1
Other sectors 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.8 6.1 1.9 0.1
Average nominal monthly wage
In Euros 835.8 732.7 1436.5 668.8 596.0 716.1 449.4
% Minimum wage earners 8.0 12.6 6.8 8.4 13.3 16.7 57.3
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
Notes: The shares of main immigrant groups are computed as a percentage of total immigrants. EU15 includes the other 14 initial
Member-States of European Union. CEEC (Central and Eastern European countries) includes Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Russian Federation, Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia. PALOP (Países Africanos de
Língua Oficial Portuguesa) refers to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique,
and São Tomé and Príncipe). Illiterate refers to no formal education or below ISCED 1, 4 years completed (primary education) and
6 years completed (second stage of basic education) are both included in ISCED 1, 9 years completed refers to ISCED 2 (lower
secondary education), 12 years completed refers to ISCED 3-4 (upper-secondary) and tertiary refers to ISCED 5-6. ISCED stands for
International Standard Classification of Education. The percentage of minimum wage earners was computed considering workers
with wages in the interval of +/- 1 euro centred on the minimum wage.
very different. Immigrants are especially concentrated in three sub-sectors: hotels and
restaurants, business services, and wholesale and retail trade.
Regarding wages, the wage setting system in Portugal is common to both native and
immigrant workers irrespective of the type of contract (permanent or fixed-term). This
framework is mainly determined by three thresholds and there is not an automatic
wage indexation mechanism (see (Carneiro et al. 2012) for a detailed description of the
Portuguese wage setting system in this period). First, the lower limit is defined, at the
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national level, through the legal mechanism of the minimum wage. Second, nominal base
wage cuts in the private sector are forbidden by law. Finally, in the context of wage bar-
gaining, the majority of the lower wage limits for each professional group are defined by
sectoral agreements, as firm agreements are the exception. Afterwards, the Ministry of
Labour extends the collective agreements to the workers initially not covered, so the dis-
tinction between union and non-union membership is largely meaningless in Portugal.
Whatever theminimum contractual wage levels set by collective bargaining, firms are free
to pay higher wages and they often deviate from that benchmark (Cardoso and Portugal
2005).
Given this institutional background, the distribution of nominal wage levels has a mode
in wages equal to, or very close to, the minimum wage (Figure 1). This is true for both
total workers and workers who stayed for at least two consecutive years in the same firm
(job stayers)2. As workers who enter a given firm in a given year, either natives or immi-
grants, tend to earn lower wages, the concentration in the bottom-end of the nominal
wage distribution is higher for total workers than for job stayers. Furthermore, in both
cases, immigrants are more concentrated in lower wages than natives.
Not controlling for any differentiating factors, immigrants in Portugal are, on average,
paid below the nominal wages of native workers in the 2002-2008 period. There are also
important differences in average nominal wages among immigrants. The average wage of
workers from the EU15 is about twice as high as the average immigrant wage and substan-
tially higher than the average native wage. In contrast, Chinese immigrants earn wages
significantly lower than the other immigrant groups.
The percentage of minimum wage earners is higher for immigrants than for natives3.
Around 8 percent of native workers earn the minimum wage, but the average share of
minimum wage earners reaches almost 13 percent for immigrants in this period. Immi-
grants from the EU15 have the lowest share of minimum wage earners, while almost 60
percent of Chinese workers are reported as earning the minimum wage in this period.
After a period where it remained fairly stable, the percentage of minimumwage earners
grew for natives and, even more markedly, for immigrants in 2007 and 2008, amidst very
strong increases of the legal minimum wage (Figure 2). From 2002 to 2006, the minimum
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Figure 1 Distribution of nominal monthly wages levels in Portugal, 2008. (a) Total, (b) Stayers.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
Note: Job stayers include only workers who stayed for at least two consecutive years in the same firm.
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Figure 2 Nominal minimumwage, 2002-2008. (a) Share of minimum wage earners, (b) Rate of change.
Sources: Statistics Portugal and Quadros de Pessoal.
Notes: Workers earning the minimum wage include all workers whose nominal wages lie in an interval
of +/- 1 euros centred on the minimum wage. The observed inflation rate in Portugal is measured by the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
bargaining, resulting in changes of the real minimumwage close to zero. In 2007 and 2008,
the minimum wage increased well above the inflation rate, reflecting the goal of reaching
a 500 euros minimum wage by 2011 set in December 2006 (see (Centeno et al. 2011)
for a description of the evolution of the minimum wage in Portugal in this period). The
nominal minimum wage increased by 4.4 percent in 2007 and 5.7 percent in 2008, which
translated into real rates of change of 2.0 and 2.9 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively4.
4 Methodology and estimation strategy
Several attempts have been made in order to assess the causes and gauge the con-
sequences of wage rigidity. One strand of the literature relies on estimates of rigidity
obtained frommacro data (see, for instance, (Akerlof et al. 1996) and (Blanchard and Galí
2007)). Another strand tries to exploit the increased availability of longitudinal databases
with extensive information on individual wages.
There are different approaches in the literature to estimate wage rigidities from lon-
gitudinal databases. Firstly, studies like those by (Card and Hyslop 1997) and (Dickens
et al. 2007) use potential asymmetries in the distribution of wage changes to draw infer-
ence about rigidities. This symmetry approach can be problematic when reasonable
estimates of the expected rate of inflation lie above the median wage change. Secondly,
the histogram-location approach of (Kahn 1997) assumes that the shape of the distri-
bution of wage changes is constant over time in the absence of changes in the extent of
rigidity. This non-parametric method depends on the existence of sufficient variation
in the median of the distribution, which may not be the case in an environment with
relatively low and stable inflation. Thirdly, the earnings-function approach proposed by
(Altonji and Devereux 2000) and extended by (Goette et al. 2007) defines the notional
wage change that holds under wage flexibility as a function of worker and firm character-
istics. Downward wage rigidity and measurement error parameters are jointly estimated
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using maximum likelihood, but the assumption of normality of the distributions of wage
changes and measurement errors can be elusive.
The International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) was a large network studying wage
rigidities from individual data of 16 OECD countries. Using the large database of cross-
country micro data available within the network, these three different microeconomic
approaches to estimating wage rigidity were tested (see (Messina et al. 2010)). The results
of the various tests, together with the extensive analysis of the data from the several coun-
tries, led to the development of a new methodology for jointly estimating the extent of
both nominal and real wage rigidity in the presence of measurement error. This method-
ology for calculating aggregate nominal and real wage rigidity is based on the analysis of
the distributions of individual wage changes, requiring a large longitudinal data set but
not detailed information on workers and firm characteristics.
According to the IWFP methodology, the nominal rigidity concept is associated with
the share of workers who have nil wage changes and would see their wages fall in the
absence of rigidity. In turn, real rigidity reflects the share of workers whose wage change is
bounded by the expected inflation rate, but would be lower in the absence of rigidity. Esti-
mations of downward nominal and real wage rigidity following the IWFP methodology
include the works of (Du Caju et al. 2007), (Duarte 2008) and (Messina et al. 2010).
A detailed review of the IWFPmethodology can be found in (Dickens and Goette 2005),
so here we will just provide a brief description of it. The theoretical model underlying
this methodology assumes that the actual nominal wage change of worker i in period t
(dit) equals the notional (counterfactual or rigidity-free) nominal wage change (dnit) except
when rigidity-related constraints exist. So, theoretical nominal wage changes in a rigidity-




0, if (dnit ≤ 0 and εnit < nt) or (−0.01 ≤ dnit ≤ 0.01 and ε1it < s1t)
or (−0.02 ≤ dnit < −0.01 or 0.01 < dnit ≤ 0.02 and ε2it < s2t)
π eit , if dnit ≤ π eit and εrit < ρt
dnit , otherwise
(1)
where εnit , εrit , ε1it and ε2it are i.i.d. random variables drawn from a uniform distribution
on the unit interval, s1t and s2t represent the probability of being subject to symmetric
nominal rigidity due to the proximity with nil wage change (affected by menu costs), π eit
is a normally distributed random variable with mean μπ et and variance σπ
e
t representing
the expected rate of inflation for this wage, nt denotes the probability of being subject
to downward nominal wage rigidity if the notional nominal wage change is negative and,
finally, ρt the probability of being subject to downward real wage rigidity if the notional
nominal wage is less than the expected rate of inflation.
The notional distribution of wage changes is assumed to follow a symmetric Weibull
distribution with three parameters - at denotes the scale parameter, μt is the mean of
the distribution and ct represents the shape parameter5. The expected rate of inflation
(π eit) is assumed to evolve within boundaries. How are these boundaries defined? For a
given year, consider the observed inflation rate, its lagged value and an estimate obtained
from a simple regression of observed inflation on its first lag. The range for the expected
inflation parameter has the minimum of these three figures as the lower bound and the
upper bound is their maximum.
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t , nt , ρt , s1t
and s2t - are obtained through an optimisation procedure by the generalised method of
moments (GMM), which tries to minimise the squared differences between the theoreti-
cal and the observed wage changes. The higher the concentration in the nil wage change
of the observed distribution vis-à-vis the notional distribution, the greater the evidence
in favour of nominal rigidity and, hence, the higher the measure of nominal rigidity.
Similarly, the higher the concentration of the observed distribution, compared with the
notional distribution, in a wage change close to the expected inflation rate, the greater the
evidence in favour of real rigidity and the higher the value of the measure.
If measurement errors are detected, the procedure for calculating the rigidity measures
tries to purge them from the wage change distribution by computing a new distribution,
named as the “true” or “error-corrected” distribution, which replaces the observed dis-
tribution in Equation 1. The detection of measurement errors is based on the analysis of
the autocorrelation of wage changes: positive changes followed by negative changes are
taken as a sign of the existence of measurement errors (for further details, see (Dickens
and Goette 2005)).
The estimated real rigidity bound (π eit) does not have a straightforward interpretation,
even if the IWFP methodology named it “expected inflation rate” and its range is linked
to past and present values of the inflation rate. It can also reflect collective bargaining
wage agreements, legal minimumwages and automatic indexation clauses. If institutional
rigidities play a significant role in the wage-setting process, distinguishing the different
types of rigidity - nominal, real and institutional - becomes extremely difficult. If the ref-
erence values for collective bargain and/or minimum wages are similar to the expected
inflation rate, the IWFP real rigidity measure will reflect both “strictly” real and insti-
tutional rigidities. This fact can be especially relevant in a country like Portugal, that
besides having a restrictive job protection legislation for permanent contracts, has a high
degree of centralisation in collective bargaining with widespread extension mechanisms
and national mandatory minimum wages.
The difficulty to distinguish between“strictly” real and institutional wage rigidities is
also evident in the way the average wage sweep-ups are computed with the IWFPmethod-
ology. The total average wage sweep-up is simply the difference between the average
observed (or “true”) wage change and the average notional wage change and can be inter-
preted as the overall increase in the average wage growth due to the presence of rigidities.
In each year, the wage sweep-up from nominal wage rigidity measures the increase in the
average wage change because of prevented nominal wage reductions. Instead of decreas-
ing, the wages of workers affected by nominal wage rigidity are frozen. Thus, the impact
of downward nominal wage rigidity reflects the difference between a nil wage change and
the average notional wage change of the rigidity-affected workers times the percentage
of these workers (the estimated nt). In the IWFP methodology, the wage sweep-up from
real rigidity is obtained as a residual given the total average effect of rigidity and the esti-
mated wage effect associated with nominal wage rigidity. This difference measures by
how much the average wage change is higher because of the existence of both “strictly”
real and institutional rigidities.
The observable individual heterogeneity of wage changes is crucial to the optimisation
processes generating both the notional and, if need be, the “true” wage change distribu-
tions. However, we can only recover the incidence of wage rigidity at the aggregate level,
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not at the worker-level. For each cross-section of individual wage changes, we obtain a set
of parameters which describe the key features of the model: the average rate of notional
wage change and its standard deviation, the expected average inflation rate and its stan-
dard deviation, the downward nominal and real rigidity measures and the corresponding
wage sweep-ups. Given that we do not have the individual probabilities of nominal and
real wage rigidity, we cannot regress these probabilities on a set of standard worker
and firm-level controls (like union coverage, minimum wage earners, type of contract,
sector of activity) and an immigrant dummy identifier. So, our goal of assessing the dif-
ferences between immigrants and natives in terms of wage rigidity was accomplished by
calculating the aggregate measures using separate samples for natives and immigrants6.
Using separate samples for natives and immigrants implies that all relevant parameters
of the model can independently vary between natives and immigrants. But should the
empirical and notional distributions of wage changes be group-specific? Immigrants tend
to receive lower wages upon arrival in the host country than comparable native workers.
The imperfect portability of human capital acquired in the origin country, as well as the
lack of fluency in the destination language, were found to be important determinants of
this wage gap (see, for instance, (Friedberg 2000) and (Aydemir and Skuterud 2005)). Over
time, immigrants’ wages tend to converge as they engage in a process of acquiring skills
relevant for the destination country, but, in some countries, the wage gap never closes. For
Portugal, (Cabral and Duarte 2013) find major differences in the wage patterns between
natives and immigrants and among different immigrant groups. In particular, returns on
education and experience differ significantly by nationality in the Portuguese labour mar-
ket. In this sense, we interpreted that allowing the distributions of wage changes to differ
among nationality groups is a positive feature of the IWFP methodology in our case.
5 Empirical results
As the IWFP methodology focuses on wage changes that are not influenced by worker
mobility, the database was restricted to include only the individuals who worked for at
least two consecutive years in the same firm (job stayers). This leads to a substantial
reduction of the total number of workers. However, the main differentiating characteris-
tics of natives and immigrants described in Section 3.1 remain valid (see Appendix). In
the case of the total and natives samples, the number of job stayers is still very large, so, for
computational convenience, a 10 percent random sample was selected for calculating the
rigidity measures7. In the case of immigrants, the sizes of the samples of job stayers are
much smaller. Thus, we used these samples directly in the estimation of the wage rigidity
measures.
As expected, the incidence of measurement errors in the QP database is extremely
limited and, hence, the differences between the observed distributions of wage changes
and the “error-corrected” distributions are virtually nil. We opted to use the observed
distributions, but this choice has no significant impact in the results8.
All estimates of nominal and real wage rigidity were done using a regular wage measure,
which includes the base wage and all regular benefits. For the estimation of wage rigidity
from the firm’s perspective, a more comprehensive analysis would focus on total labour
costs per worker, that is, total compensation, which comprises also all non-regular bene-
fits and overtime pay. However, given that we only have data for one month in each year,
to use total compensation could result in spurious wage changes, reflecting the payment
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of non-regular benefits in different months from one year to the other. Another possibility
would be to use only the base wage. As a robustness check, we replicated all estimations
using the base wage and the main results are qualitatively similar9.
Figure 3 displays the histograms of the observed wage change distributions, i.e., the
empirical distributions, and the notional rigidity-free distributions of wage changes for
the total sample from 2003 to 2008. Contrasting with the notional wage distributions,
negative nominal wage changes are very limited in the empirical distributions and there
is very high concentration on the zero change. Between 2003 and 2006, the distribution
of nominal wage changes has a second mode near the expected inflation rate (and bar-
gaining and minimum wage reference values). In 2007 and 2008, the distribution of wage
changes has three spikes - at zero, at the expected inflation rate value (and bargaining
reference value) and at the rate of change of the minimum wage. Despite differences in
the relative size of the spikes, the main features of the empirical distributions of nominal
wage changes - near absence of negative changes and two- or three-spike distributions -
are common to native and immigrant workers10. The fact that the empirical distributions
of wage changes show only a small fraction of negative nominal changes and a very high
concentration on the nil change suggests resistance to nominal wage declines (nominal
rigidity). Furthermore, the existence of a second mode near the expected inflation rate
and a smaller concentration in rates immediately below are evidence in favour of real wage
rigidity.
The hints obtained from the visual inspection of the wage change distributions are con-
firmed by the estimated measures of nominal and real wage rigidity displayed in Figure 4.
The Appendix includes the yearly estimates of the notional and empirical average wage
changes, the corresponding average wage sweep-ups, the expected inflation rate or real
rigidity bound, and the nominal and real rigidity measures for the whole sample and for
the separate samples for natives and immigrants. The IWFP methodology accounts for
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Figure 3 Distributions of nominal monthly wage changes in Portugal, total sample. (a) 2003, (b) 2004,
(c) 2005, (d) 2006, (e) 2007 and (f) 2008.
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Figure 4 Nominal and real wage rigidity for natives and immigrants in Portugal. (a) Downward
nominal wage rigidity, (b) Downward real wage rigidity.
years and samples, as well as for changes in the focal points for the computation of
real wage rigidity. Therefore, separate estimates for different sub-samples (natives and
immigrants, in this case) do not necessarily average out to the estimate for the entire
sample.
Let us now examine in more detail the percentage of workers affected by nominal and
real wage rigidities. For the total sample, 47.1 percent of the workers who would have a
nominal wage cut in the absence of rigidity, have instead nil wage changes in the period
2003-2008. This result not only is influenced by the legal framework associated with the
existing barriers to nominal base wage cuts, but is also related to the fact that, even in the
absence of legal constraints, firms tend to avoid nominal wage cuts for motivational rea-
sons (see (Bewley 1998) and (Howitt 2002)). The results are relatively similar when native
and immigrant workers are analysed separately. In some years, nominal wage rigidity is
higher for immigrants than for natives and the opposite happens in other years. On aver-
age, in the 2003-2008 period, the difference between natives and immigrants in terms of
the incidence of nominal wage rigidity is small (around 1 percentage point).
The differences between natives and immigrants in terms of real wage rigidity are
higher. For the total sample, 19.7 percent of the workers who would face a decline in
their real wages in a context of wage flexibility, see their wages increase in line with the
expected inflation rate in the period 2003-2008. The average percentage of immigrant
workers affected by real wage rigidity in this period reaches 22.7 percent, which compares
to 18.1 percent for native workers.
The real wage rigidity measures have an irregular behaviour over the 2003-2008 period.
The estimated measures tend to increase from 2003 to 2006, are virtually nil in 2007 and
increase again in 2008, but to a level below the average of previous years. The reduction
in the real rigidity measures in the last two years was common to native and immigrant
workers.
Up to 2006, the real wage rigidity measure combined both “strictly” real and institu-
tional rigidities, related to collective bargaining and mandatory minimum wages. In the
distribution of wage changes, the share of individuals covered by collective bargaining
and/or earning the minimum wage reinforced the spike at the expected inflation rate. In
contrast, in 2007 and 2008, instead of having a two-spike distribution of wage changes,
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the distribution of wage changes has three spikes - at zero, at the expected inflation rate
(and wage bargaining reference value), and at the rate of change of the minimum wage.
In these years, the IWFP methodology only takes into account the non-zero spike that
is more significant in the range of the estimated expected inflation rate. Hence, in both
years, the focal points implicit in the real rigidity measures do not reflected the rate of
change of theminimumwage and the corresponding real rigidity measures do not include
the percentage of minimum wage earners11. Hence, the evolution of the minimum wage
induced a break in the series of the real wage rigidity measure in 2007.
In the period until 2006, we obtained higher values of the real rigiditymeasure for immi-
grants. Why would immigrants be more prone to real wage freezes? There are several
factors that can contribute to this result like differences in terms of tenure, the incidence
of the different types of contract, the sectoral distribution of workers or the proportion
of minimum wage earners. In 2008, where the estimated real wage rigidity measure cap-
tures only “strictly” real rigidity and not the impact of mandatory minimum wages, the
percentage of workers affected by real wage rigidity is smaller for immigrants than for
natives. So, the higher real wage rigidity for immigrants up to 2006 is likely to reflect the
higher concentration of immigrant workers in the minimum wage.
To better assess the impact of the minimum wage on the incidence of downward wage
rigidity in Portugal, we re-estimated the rigidity measures using a sample that excludes all
workers earning the minimum wage (Figure 5). The estimated measures of nominal wage
rigidity are higher in the sample that excludes minimum wage earners, but the difference
between natives and immigrants is similar. Since minimum wage earners are not subject
to nominal wage rigidity, this increase in themeasures has a simple statistical justification:
the sample of workers is now smaller, but the workers affected by nominal wage rigidity
are essentially the same, so the proportion of these workers increases.
The real wage rigidity measures estimated in the sample without minimum wage
workers are smaller than the ones estimated in the full sample for both natives and immi-
grants. However, the exclusion of minimum wage earners from the sample leads to a
sharper reduction of the proportion of immigrant workers subject to real wage rigidity
(to 16.1 percent), which is now slightly below the one estimated for natives (17.6 per-





























Figure 5 Nominal and real wage rigidity excluding minimumwage earners, average 2003-2008.
(a) Downward nominal wage rigidity, (b) Downward real wage rigidity.
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sample appears to be linked to the higher share of minimum wage earners in immigrant
employment.
As suggested in Figure 3, the mean of the estimated notional wage change distribution
is always smaller than that of the empirical wage change distribution, reflecting the exis-
tence of wage rigidities. The related wage sweep-ups, which measure the overall increase
in the average wage growth due to the presence of rigidities, are higher for immigrants
than for natives, in particular due to non-nominal wage rigidity (Figure 6). Recall that,
even if the real wage rigidity measures do not capture the effect of legal minimum wages
in 2007 and 2008, the average wage sweep-ups always include, by construction, the impact
of both real and institutional rigidities on average wages. In the absence of downward real
and institutional wage rigidity, the average wages of immigrants would have grown by less
1.9 percentage points per year on average during this period, which compares to 1.2 per-
centage points for native workers. In comparison, the average wage sweep-up caused by
nominal rigidity for immigrant workers is smaller (1.2 percentage points per year) and
similar to the one obtained for natives (1.0 percentage points).
5.1 Accounting for heterogeneity by immigrant origin
The previous estimates differentiate between natives and immigrants but assume
that wage rigidity is homogeneous among immigrants’ nationalities. As described in
Section 3.1, immigrant workers in Portugal are not a homogeneous group, so we re-
estimated the model using separate samples for the major immigrant groups in Portugal
(Brazil, PALOP and CEEC) and also for the EU15 and China. Immigrants from the EU15
are very different from the average immigrant worker, as they are much more qualified
and earn much higher wages, on average. At the other extreme are the immigrants from
China, which grew strongly in recent years: they are the least qualified and earn the lowest
wages, on average. Table 2 shows the estimated nominal and real wage rigidity measures
for each immigrant group, on average in the 2003-2008 period.
The measure of nominal rigidity estimated for immigrants from PALOP is the low-
est of all nationality groups considered, including the natives. This result is in line with
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Figure 6 Average wage sweep-up due to downward wage rigidity, average 2003-2008.
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Table 2 Nominal and real wage rigidity bymain nationalities, in percentage, average
2003-2008
Total Natives Immigrants EU15 PALOP CEEC Brazil China
Total sample
Nominal wage rigidity 47.1 47.6 48.8 53.7 38.8 57.9 60.2 64.8
Real wage rigidity 19.7 18.1 22.7 28.0 19.1 25.1 28.4 45.0
Excludingminimum
wage earners
Nominal wage rigidity 50.7 50.9 52.3 58.4 41.3 51.5 54.3 77.5
Real wage rigidity 17.3 17.6 16.1 25.8 19.5 10.8 16.3 12.5
workers. These workers have a lower probability of reducing effort or quitting the job
in response to a wage cut. The cost of hiring and training replacements and the loss of
firm-specific human capital if the workers quit are also less significant for these workers.
In addition, more than 15 percent of immigrants from PALOP are employed in tempo-
rary work agencies and in cleaning services, typically jobs with low replacement costs
and, hence, more prone to wage cuts. A symmetric reasoning for high-skilled white-collar
workers applies to the high nominal rigidity obtained for EU15 immigrants. At odds with
these theoretical predictions, the estimated measures of nominal wage rigidity of immi-
grants from CEEC, Brazil and China are above those of native workers. However, this
result is in line with other studies that found that nominal wage rigidity tends to be high
at the bottom of the earnings distribution (see (Du Caju et al. 2007) for Belgium).
The estimated measures of real wage rigidity of the different immigrant groups are
above those of native workers, but the difference is very small in the case of PALOP
workers. Chinese workers, which have the highest proportion of minimum wage earners,
also have the highest value for the real wage rigidity measure. In fact, with the exception
of EU15 and PALOP workers, the estimated higher real wage rigidity measure seems to
reflect the greater concentration of immigrant workers in the minimum wage. Excluding
minimumwage earners from the sample, we obtain a lower incidence of real wage rigidity
for these immigrant groups than for native workers.
The combined average wage sweep-ups due to wage rigidity for the various immi-
grant groups are higher than those estimated for natives (Figure 7). This difference is
higher in the case of EU15 and Chinese immigrants: the effect of sweeping up all nomi-
nal and real notional wage cuts for workers affected by wage rigidity raises average wage
growth by around 3 percentage points per year in both cases. This increase in average
labour costs due to downward wage rigidity can have an adverse impact in future labour
market outcomes. (Barwell and Schweitzer 2007) found that British workers who are
more likely to be protected from wage cuts are also more likely to lose their jobs and
(Devicienti et al. 2007) concluded that downward wage rigidities in Italy have a positive
impact on worker turnover at the firm level and on local unemployment rates. This fact
can be especially important for immigrant groups with a higher share of young and poorly
educated workers with fixed-term contracts. The higher educational level and incidence
of permanent contracts of EU15 immigrants can shield them more as firms try to replace
workers affected by downward rigidities in response to adverse demand shocks.
6 Conclusions
Some characteristics of immigrant workers, as the high share of fixed-term contracts and
their higher geographical mobility, can lead to an increase in the flexibility of the labour
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Figure 7 Average wage sweep-up due to downward wage rigidity by main nationalities, average
2003-2008.
market. But what about wages changes? In a low inflation environment, nominal wage
rigidity can be an important obstacle to the real wage adjustments that firms need to do
in response to negative demand shocks. This effect can be especially strong in a coun-
try like Portugal where there is specific legislation, like the illegality of cutting nominal
base wages, that directly influences nominal wage rigidity. (Carneiro et al. 2013) find
that downward wage rigidity in Portugal is associated with lower net job creation and
higher failure rates of firms. According to most theories, one would expect a higher wage
rigidity for natives, which are on average older, more-tenured, have greater bargaining
power and a much higher share of permanent contracts. So, immigrant workers could
help to increase wage flexibility, thus improving the allocative role of wages in the labour
market.
In this paper, we investigate the differences in terms of downward nominal and real
wage rigidity between natives and immigrants in Portugal, using micro data on individual
wages from 2002 to 2008 and accounting for the potential heterogeneity of immigrants by
main origins.
The answer to our initial question is no, nationality does not seem to matter that much,
but if anything immigrants’ wages tend to be more rigid. The average wage sweep-ups,
which measure the overall increase in the average wage growth due to the presence of
rigidities, are higher for immigrants than for natives, in particular due to non-nominal
wage rigidity. Therefore, a higher percentage of immigrant workers in the Portuguese
labour market does not seem to result in higher wage flexibility, contradicting our initial
expectations.
What can explain this evidence? The institutional characteristics of the Portuguese
labour market - mandatory minimum wages and collective wage agreements - play a
crucial role in the wage-setting procedure and are common to native and immigrant
workers. The higher measure of real wage rigidity obtained for immigrants is associated
with a higher incidence of institutional rigidity, given the greater share of immigrants
receiving the minimum wage. Excluding minimum wage earners from the sample, the
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estimated measures of real wage rigidity are slightly smaller for immigrants than for
natives.
We also assess the extent of nominal and real wage rigidity by main immigrant nation-
alities and find that the results are not homogeneous across different immigrant groups.
The incidence of nominal wage rigidity among workers from Portuguese speaking coun-
tries in Africa (PALOP) is the lowest of all nationality groups considered, including the
natives. This result is in line with most labour market theories that predict a lower wage
rigidity for low-skilled blue-collar workers. The proportion of workers affected by down-
ward real wage rigidity is the highest for immigrants from China, reflecting the greater
concentration of these workers in the minimum wage. Excluding minimum wage earners
from the sample, we obtain a lower incidence of real wage rigidity for Chinese immigrants
than for natives.
We consider that the evidence in this paper uncovers an interesting link between the
literature on wage differences between natives and immigrants and the ongoing debate
about the setting of minimum wages and their policy implications. (Centeno et al. 2011)
estimate the impact of increases in the minimum wage on employment stability, wages
and inequality in Portugal and find evidence of a detrimental effect of minimum wage
increases for employment stability of low-wage workers, with onlyminor gains in terms of
wages. In addition, our evidence suggests that the minimum wage contributes to increase
wage rigidity, in general, and even further in the case of immigrants, with potential
negative effects on the employment prospects of immigrant workers.
Endnotes
1By law, workers formally classified as apprentices can receive a minimum wage that
is, at least, 80 percent of the full rate.
2 The distributions of nominal wages are similar throughout the period analysed. All
annual distributions are available from the authors upon request.
3 We consider as minimum wage earners all workers whose nominal wage lies in the
interval of 1 euro centred on the minimum wage.
4 The nominal minimum wage amounted to 348 in 2002, 356.6 in 2003, 365.6 in 2004,
374.7 in 2005, 385.9 in 2006, 403 in 2007 and 426 in 2008 (values in euros).
5 For the several test performed to generate the notional or counterfactual wage
change distribution and the justification of the choice of the Weibull distribution, see
(Dickens and Goette 2005).
6 The same reasoning applies when we go into further detail to assess the impact of the
minimum wage or the heterogeneity of the results by main immigrant nationalities: all
estimations were replicated using the respective separate samples (e.g. natives not
earning the minimum wage, immigrants from Brazil, etc.).
7 The results are qualitatively invariant to a different choice of threshold for selecting
the random sample.
8 All distributions are available from the authors upon request.
9 All results are available from the authors upon request.
10 The corresponding distributions estimated for the separate samples of natives and
immigrants are omitted for the sake of brevity. Again, all distributions are available from
the authors upon request.
11 By restricting the range over which the IWFP routine searches for signs of real wage
rigidity one could force the results to reflect the rate of change of the minimum wage
spike. We opted against imposing an ad-hoc range based on a judgment, letting the
routine freely select the most significant non-zero spike.
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Appendix
This Appendix includes two tables. For the sample of job stayers, Table 3 shows the
sample means of some relevant variables for natives, immigrants, and the five main
nationalities of immigrant workers. Table 4 reports the main results of the estimation
of downward nominal and real wage rigidity using International Wage Flexibility Project
(IWFP) methodology for natives and immigrants. It includes the yearly estimates of the
notional and empirical average wage changes, the corresponding average wage sweep-
ups, the expected inflation rate, the nominal and real rigidity measures for the whole
sample and for natives and immigrants, as well as the respective sample sizes.
Table 3Main characteristics of native and immigrant workers in Portugal, sample of job
stayers, average 2002-2008
Natives Immigrants EU15 PALOP CEEC Brazil China
Levels in 2008 1,386,734 62,374 7,241 15,208 14,901 13,454 804
Share in total, 2008 95.7 4.3 11.6 24.4 23.9 21.6 1.3
Type of contract (%)
Permanent contract 81.6 53.2 72.2 59.6 40.0 43.3 48.3
Fixed-term contract 18.4 46.8 27.8 40.4 60.0 56.7 51.7
Age
Average years 38.1 36.1 36.9 37.0 36.5 33.4 34.4
% workers aged less 35 years 42.4 48.9 49.3 43.9 46.5 60.9 53.3
Tenure
Average years 8.1 3.3 4.6 3.8 2.2 2.1 1.8
[0, 3] 39.2 71.3 56.7 65.0 81.9 82.6 86.2
Educational attainment (%)
Illiterate 1.2 4.2 0.5 5.4 6.8 1.7 17.1
4 years completed 24.0 21.8 7.2 31.7 20.6 16.4 41.3
6 years completed 22.0 17.1 11.7 16.9 17.0 18.9 13.9
9 years completed 20.9 23.4 18.8 21.4 26.4 26.2 18.5
12 years completed 20.2 23.1 28.8 17.2 22.9 29.8 6.4
Tertiary 11.6 10.4 33.0 7.4 6.3 7.0 2.8
Main sectors of activity (%)
Manufacturing industry 30.1 19.3 22.3 11.2 26.2 13.4 1.3
Construction 10.7 20.9 7.6 26.3 29.3 16.8 0.6
Services, of which: 56.5 56.5 67.7 61.3 37.9 67.8 98.0
Wholesale and retail trade 20.2 15.3 20.3 13.1 10.1 18.2 53.9
Hotels and restaurants 5.7 14.8 9.8 15.4 10.4 23.3 41.7
Business services 8.6 10.9 11.8 16.7 6.7 11.0 0.9
Other sectors 2.7 3.3 2.4 1.2 6.6 1.9 0.1
Average nominal monthly wage
In Euros 858.3 790.6 1507.9 718.8 599.3 787.8 456.8
% Minimum wage earners 7.3 11.7 6.1 7.8 13.5 14.9 56.3
Source: Quadros de Pessoal.
Notes: The sample of job stayers includes only the workers who stayed for at least two consecutive years in the same firm. The
shares of main immigrant groups are computed as a percentage of total immigrants. EU15 includes the other 14 initial
Member-States of European Union. CEEC (Central and Eastern European countries) includes Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Russian Federation, Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia. PALOP (Países Africanos de
Língua Oficial Portuguesa) refers to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique,
and São Tomé and Príncipe). Illiterate refers to no formal education or below ISCED 1, 4 years completed (primary education) and
6 years completed (second stage of basic education) are both included in ISCED 1, 9 years completed refers to ISCED 2 (lower
secondary education), 12 years completed refers to ISCED 3-4 (upper-secondary) and tertiary refers to ISCED 5-6. ISCED stands for
International Standard Classification of Education. The percentage of minimum wage earners was computed considering workers
with wages in the interval of +/- 1 euro centred on the minimum wage.
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Table 4 Estimates of downward nominal and real wage rigidity for natives and immigrants
in Portugal
Total sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003-2008
Average empirical wage change 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.4
Average notional wage change 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.5 2.6 2.6 2.1
Expected inflation rate 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5
Average wage sweep-up, from: 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.3
Nominal wage rigidity 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0
Real and institutional wage rigidity 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.3
Nominal wage rigidity measure 45.8 42.7 48.6 50.6 48.0 47.1 47.1
Real wage rigidity measure 16.9 28.5 22.4 30.8 0.0 19.5 19.7
Number of observations 171,270 169,835 173,582 173,903 173,408 144,911 –
Natives 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003-2008
Average empirical wage change 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.4
Average notional wage change 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.2
Expected inflation rate 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5
Average wage sweep-up, from: 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.2
Nominal wage rigidity 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0
Real and institutional wage rigidity 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.2
Nominal wage rigidity measure 46.0 45.6 48.2 50.4 48.3 47.2 47.6
Real wage rigidity measure 15.8 19.6 22.4 30.5 0.2 19.9 18.1
Number of observations 163,597 161,802 165,205 165,593 165,157 138,673 –
Immigrants 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003-2008
Average empirical wage change 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.6 5.3 5.5 4.8
Average notional wage change 1.7 -0.1 1.9 1.1 2.7 2.8 1.7
Expected inflation rate 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5
Average wage sweep-up, from: 2.8 4.3 2.8 3.5 2.6 2.7 3.1
Nominal wage rigidity 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.2
Real and institutional wage rigidity 1.8 2.8 1.6 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.9
Nominal wage rigidity measure 43.3 53.9 49.1 54.9 47.6 43.8 48.8
Real wage rigidity measure 31.9 34.9 25.2 31.2 0.4 13.0 22.7
Number of observations 76,727 80,329 83,769 83,102 82,510 62,374 –
Notes: All samples include only workers who stayed for at least two consecutive years in the same firm (job stayers). In the case of
the total and natives samples, the number of observations in each year refers to a 10 percent random sample that was selected
from the respective samples of job stayers for estimating the rigidity measures. In the case of immigrants, the number
observations refers to the total sample of job stayers.
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